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Wai L. Woo, Senior Member, IEEE and Jonathon A. Chambers, Fellow, IEEE
Abstract—This paper presents a novel security architecture
for protecting the integrity of iris images and templates using
watermarking and Visual Cryptography (VC). The proposed
scheme offers a complete protection framework for the iris
biometrics which consists of two stages: the first stage is for iris
image protection while the second is for the iris template. Firstly,
for protecting the iris image, a watermark text which carries
personal information is embedded in the middle band frequency
region of the iris image using a novel watermarking algorithm
that randomly interchanges multiple middle band pairs of the
Discrete Cosine Transform (DCT). Secondly, for iris template
protection, the binary iris template is divided into two shares
using VC, where one share is stored in the database and the
other is kept with the user on a smart card. In addition, the
SHA-2 hash function is utilized to maintain the integrity of
the stored iris template in both the database and smart card.
The experimental and comparison results on the CASIA V4
and UBIRIS V1 iris databases demonstrate that the proposed
framework preserves the privacy of the iris images and templates
and retains robustness to malicious attacks while it does not have
a discernible effect on the recognition performance.
Index Terms—Biometrics, iris recognition, security and privacy
protection, watermarking, smart card, template security, visual
cryptography
I. INTRODUCTION
DESPITE the fact that biometric systems offer reliabletechniques for personal identification, their usage could
be hampered by the lack of a proper protection scheme that
guarantees the security and privacy of the biometric traits.
When biometric images or templates are transmitted through
insecure channels or stored as raw data, they run risks of being
stolen or modified. Hence, it is imperative that robust and
reliable means of biometric protection are implemented [1].
Ratha et al. [2] described eight types of attacks that are
possible in a biometric system, such as database template
tampering, template modification, the matcher override of the
final decision and attack on the channel between the feature
extractor and the matcher, or attack on the channel between
the database and matcher. Moreover, due to the wide spread of
biometrics technology in many applications, it is very likely
that biometric data are being transmitted over non secure
channels. Hence, for a biometric system to work properly, the
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system must guarantee that the biometric data came from a
legitimate person at the time of enrolment.
Several means are employed to protect biometric data such
as only encryption, or watermarking and encryption. Encryp-
tion can be used as one potential mechanism for protecting
the biometric features as in [3]. However, encryption may
limit the capacity of large scale biometric systems because
it can be computationally expensive. In addition, encryption
cannot provide complete protection as the templates must be
decrypted before matching. Jain et al. emphasized this in [4]
by suggesting that if only cryptographic techniques are used
for the protection of biometric data, security of such data is
not fully maintained because this data has to be decrypted
somewhere.
Therefore, the use of watermarking technology has emerged.
Since watermarking involves hiding information within the
host data, it can provide security even after decryption. On
the other hand, Visual Cryptography (VC) can be utilized
for biometric template protection. The most commonly used
template for an iris recognition system is the so called IrisCode
which is a binary compact representation of the iris [5].
This template is usually stored as raw data in databases or
transmitted over unsecured channels. It was believed in the
biometrics community that this type of iris representation does
not reveal adequate information to regenerate the iris image as
the encoding process is a one-way function. However, recently
researchers [6], [7] were able to propose a reversibility scheme
for the IrisCode. For instance, the authors in [7] proposed a
reconstruction method for iris images from a binary template
using a probabilistic approach based on genetic algorithms
where they analyzed the vulnerabilities of commercial iris
recognition systems by matching the reconstructed synthetic
images against the original ones. Their experiments showed
the fragility of such systems against this type of attack.
Due to the aforementioned points, it is imperative to find
robust template protection methods. In this paper, we therefore
propose the first work which considers enhancing the security
of the iris biometrics through both watermarking and VC. The
proposed framework for iris biometrics protection incorporates
two stages. The first stage is a robust watermarking algorithm
to protect the evidentiary integrity of the iris images based
on randomly exchanging four middle band coefficient pairs of
the DCT to embed text data as a contextual watermark in the
iris image. The second stage is a VC scheme for iris template
protection that neither involves pixel expansion nor quality
2loss in the iris template. Therefore, after decomposing the iris
template into two shares, one share is given to the user on a
smart card and the other share is stored in the database along
with a signature generated by a hash function. Furthermore,
the integrity of the stored iris template is also guaranteed by
using the hash signatures.
This paper is organized as follows. The next section presents
a literature review on the related works while Section III
gives an overview of the watermarking algorithms and visual
cryptography. The proposed method is explained in Section
IV. Experimental design and performance analysis are given
in Section V. Finally, Section VI concludes this paper.
II. RELATED WORKS
Various algorithms have been suggested to protect biometric
data using watermarking. Park et al. [8] proposed a watermark-
ing method to embed the iris feature inside a face image and
tested their method under different attacks. Hassanien et al.
[9] suggested a watermarking technique based on the Discrete
Wavelet Transform (DWT) to embed iris data into the content
of a digital image in order to identify the owner. However,
no experiments have been undertaken on the effect of the
watermarking on the iris recognition performance. Later, the
authors in [10] applied a biometric watermarking by taking
the DWT and the Singular Value Decomposition (SVD) of
the host image to obtain eigen vectors. Next, the iris features
were extracted with the DCT to obtain 200 coefficients and
then embedded in the eigen vector derived from the host
image. Despite the good results reported by the authors,
the drawback of this approach is that the feature extraction
algorithm for the iris cannot be changed. The work in [11]
applied watermarking to hide the fingerprint and iris features
in a cover image. The cover image is divided into blocks then
each block is transformed with a two-dimensional DCT and
classified as a smooth block or edge block. The biometric
features are embedded in the low frequency coefficients of
the 8 × 8 DCT blocks while the edge blocks are eliminated.
However, removing the edge blocks could unfortunately result
in quality degradation of the original image. A watermarking
algorithm is proposed in our previous work [12] to protect
the iris images based on interchanging fixed locations of the
DCT middle band coefficients. However, there is a possibility
that an attacker can predict these fixed locations and destroy
the watermark information or embed false watermark data. In
addition, the iris template is still not protected as the aim of
that work was to protect the iris images only.
It is evident from the previous works that watermarking
can be used effectively to protect the integrity of biometric
images. However, watermarking cannot be used for biometric
template protection because watermarking introduces some
degradation to the host medium. In a biometric system, any
degradation to the template is not acceptable because such
degradation is going to affect the system performance signif-
icantly. Therefore, alternative approaches are needed. Hao et
al. [13] presented a scheme for integrating the iris biometric
into cryptographic applications. The iris code is encoded with
binary keys using XOR operation while Hadamard and Reed-
Solomon codes are used to resolve the variability in the iris
code. Good results are reported in term of False Reject Rate
(FRR) however, the iris images were ideal and according to
[14] a high FRR was recorded when the approach is applied on
the ICE database. In addition, the 44 security bits used in this
method is inadequate in the current cryptographic applications
[15]. Cimato et al. [16] proposed a multi-biometric system
which extracts an identifier (ID) from the templates of left and
right irises of each user with the help of a hash function and
pseudo random permutation function. In the verification phase,
both the templates and user’s ID are required to complete
the authentication. Although the proposed method can offer a
secure ID generation, we remark that the iris template is still
not protected. In addition, this method requires two biometric
traits to generate the ID which adds more complexity.
More recently, Sui et al. [15] proposed a method to preserve
the privacy of the biometric credential. Their method fuses
the user’s biometrics (iris image) with a reference subject
using keys extracted from the user’s biometrics to generate a
BioCapsul which could be used later instead of the biometric
template for the authentication. However, this method degrades
the iris recognition performance. In addition, generating the
BioCapsul requires more complex operation compared to the
simple VC scheme that we propose in this paper. Rathgeb et
al. [17] proposed a scheme for iris template protection based
on Bloom filters. Although the usage of Bloom filters enables
irreversibility for a uniform iris template, the scheme does not
provide unlinkability. This concern is reinforced by the work
of Hermans et al. [18] which demonstrated that the scheme is
vulnerable to cross-matching attacks.
VC is a robust way of protecting an image without com-
plicated mathematical operations or any knowledge of cryp-
tography. Although there are some methods for protecting
the biometric traits with VC [19], [20], few enhance the
security of iris biometric through VC. The authors in [19]
proposed a method to secure the face image with the help
of stenography and VC to decompose the image into two
shares where each share is stored in a different database so
that the original image can be revealed only when both shares
are available. The drawback with the previous method is the
additional cost of having two database servers for saving the
shares and the possibility of tampering the templates in these
databases. In [20] the authors proposed a method to improve
the privacy of the face images using half-toning and VC to
split the face images into two encrypted parts. However, the
efficiency and robustness of this method were not supported
by experimental results or security analysis. In addition, no
information is given on how to deal with the loss in contrast
or the problem of resolution expansion of the resultant image
in the aforementioned methods.
In this paper, we fill the gap in iris biometrics security by
proposing a two-stage framework for iris images and template
protection. The first stage is a robust watermarking algorithm
to protect the evidentiary integrity of the iris images based on
exchanging multiple middle band coefficients of DCT blocks
using text data as a contextual watermark. The second stage is
protecting the iris template with VC by dividing the template
into two secret shares.
3III. WATERMARKING ALGORITHMS AND VISUAL
CRYPTOGRAPHY
As the proposed approach is based on two main schemes,
namely watermarking and visual cryptography, Section III
prepares the reader by giving a brief overview of watermarking
and visual cryptography algorithms and highlights why the
DCT has been selected as the transform basis of the proposed
watermarking algorithm.
A. Watermarking Algorithms
A number of watermarking techniques are available for
embedding information securely in an image. Watermarking
algorithms can be classified according to their embedding
domain into transformation domain techniques [21] and spatial
domain techniques [22]. In the spatial domain the pixel values
are directly modified to embed the watermark using different
approaches such as Least Significant Bit (LSB) [23] or the
correlation-based technique [24]. While the spatial domain
techniques have least complexity and high payload, they
cannot withstand low pass filtering, image compression and
common image processing attacks [25]. Therefore, transform
domain watermarking has emerged because it is robust against
image manipulations and compression. In the frequency do-
main, the host image is segmented into multiple frequency
chains using several transformations such as DWT or DCT
[21], [26]. Then, the inverse transform is applied to obtain the
watermarked image.
In principle, any frequency domain transform can be used
for image watermarking, however, frequency transformation
in the DCT domain allows an image to be divided into
different frequency bands, so they facilitate embedding the
watermarking information in a specific frequency band [27].
It has been found that the middle frequency bands are most
suitable for embedding the watermark because the low fre-
quency band carries the most visual important parts of the
image while the high frequency band is exposed to removal
through compression and noise attacks on the image. There-
fore, embedding the watermark in the middle frequency band
neither affects the visual important parts of the image (low
frequency) nor overexposes them to removal through attacks
when high frequency components are targeted [27].
B. Visual Cryptography
VC is a secret sharing scheme which was introduced by
Naor and Shamir [28] to decompose an image into n random
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Fig. 1. (2,2) visual cryptography; the 50% loss in contrast can be solved
when using the XOR operation.
Fig. 2. Frequency regions in an 8× 8 DCT block [27].
shares such that, when all these shares are superimposed, the
original image is revealed again. However, the secret image
will not be revealed if the number of stacked shares is less
than n.
In the case of (2,2) VC, each pixel in the binary image
I of size (M × N ) is encoded into two subpixels which are
denoted as SR1 and SR2 as illustrated in Fig. 1. If the pixel
is white, one of the two rows in Fig. 1 corresponding to the
white pixel is randomly chosen to generate SR1 and SR2
and vice versa for a black pixel. Therefore, neither SR1 nor
SR2 divulges any information about the binary image I . The
original image can be reconstructed again by superimposing
SR1 and SR2 together. However, the resulting image will be
of size (M × 2N ).
Although traditional VC is a simple and a powerful protec-
tion scheme, unfortunately, it has not been widely used due to
the increase in image size and the 50% loss in contrast [29].
The problem of contrast loss can be solved by superimposing
the shares together using the XOR operation instead of the OR
(as shown in Fig. 1) and hence no loss in quality will occur
in the original image. Nevertheless, the generated image is
still twice the size of the original one. In the next section we
propose an approach to remedy this problem.
IV. THE PROPOSED METHOD
In this section, we propose a two-layer iris images and
templates protection scheme. The first stage is a robust wa-
termarking algorithm to protect the iris images based on
randomly exchanging the middle band coefficients of the DCT
blocks using text data as a contextual watermark while the
second stage is focusing on protecting the iris template with
VC.
A. Stage one: iris images watermarking
The proposed watermarking algorithm is designed in a way
which will not degrade the iris image or the recognition
performance while it retains robustness to malicious attacks
and noise. Hence, the proposed algorithm encodes one-bit
of the binary watermark text into each 8 × 8 sub-block of
the host image by ensuring that the difference of two mid-
band coefficients is positive in the case the encoded value is
1. Otherwise, the two mid-band coefficients are exchanged.
Accordingly, after the DCT is applied to the image, an 8× 8
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Fig. 3. JPEG quantization table and the selected embedding locations.
block is taken. Each DCT block consists of three frequency
bands as illustrated in Fig. 2. FL and FH stand for the low and
high frequency components of the block respectively, while
FM is the middle frequency band and is chosen for embedding
watermark information. This avoids significant modifications
to the cover image while providing additional resistance to
lossy compression techniques which target the high frequency
components [30].
The proposed scheme targets the middle frequency band
FM so that two locations from the DCT block (DCTu1,v1 and
DCTu2,v2) are chosen as the region for comparison. Firstly,
the watermark text is converted to a binary image and each
pixel inside the watermark text is checked so the coefficients
are swapped if the size of each coefficient does not agree with
the bit that is to be encoded. Thus, if the pixel value in the
binary text is 1, the DCT coefficient are swapped such that
DCTu1,v1 > DCTu2,v2. On the other hand, if the pixel value
is 0, coefficients are swapped so that DCTu2,v2 > DCTu1,v1.
Hence, instead of degrading the image by inserting data,
this scheme hides the watermark by interpreting 0 or 1 with
the relative values of the two fixed locations in the FM
region (DCTu1,v1 and DCTu2,v2). It is known that the DCT
coefficients of the middle frequencies generally have similar
magnitudes [31] so swapping of such coefficients will not alter
the watermarked image significantly.
During the watermark extraction, the 8 × 8 DCT of the
cover image is taken again, and the watermarking algorithm
will decode a 1 if DCTu1,v1 > DCTu2,v2; otherwise it will
decode a 0 to form the watermark.
Yet, if only one pair of coefficients is used to hide the
watermark data, it will become vulnerable to noise and at-
tacks. Therefore, the watermark can be destroyed by image
manipulations and compression (as we demonstrate in Section
V-A5). In addition, an attacker can analyze some watermarked
copies of the same image to predict the locations of these
coefficients as well as destroy them. To solve these problems,
we propose to exchange multiple coefficient pairs by selecting
random locations from the FM frequency band for the embed-
ding purpose. Exchanging more than one pair will increase
redundancy and make the scheme robust against different
attacks. In addition, the random selection of the embedding
locations in each DCT block makes it almost impossible
for the attacker to predict these locations and destroy the
watermarking information or embed false information inside
the watermarked image.
Empirical results have shown that exchanging four pairs
from the middle frequency band gives a good trade-off be-
tween robustness and perceptibility. Basically, any of the 22
middle band locations (FM ) shown in Fig 2 can be utilized for
the embedding purpose. Nevertheless, to make the algorithm
robust against JPEG compression, eight embedding pairs have
been selected based on the recommended JPEG quantization
table. It can be seen from Fig. 3 that these locations are suitable
for embedding because they have almost the same value in the
JPEG quantization table. Therefore, a scaling applied to any of
these coefficients will scale the other one with the same factor.
This in turn will preserve the relative size of the coefficients
to be exchanged.
Thence, the location of the pairs to be exchanged will be
selected randomly from the shaded locations shown in Fig. 3
based on a private key s1 which is stored on a smart card
as illustrated later in Section IV-B1. This key (s1) is used as
an initial seed for the random number generators which will
generate the four digits vector r within the range of 1 to 8.
Hence, four new rows from the location array L shown in
Table I will be chosen for each 8×8 block of the cover image
based on the random numbers. For example, if r = [2 3 5 8]
Subdivide the host iris 
image into 8 ×8 block 
Compute the  2D-DCT of 
each block
For each bit in the 
monochrome watermark
text  (W)
W(i) = ?
Swap one pair such that:
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2: {(2,3) ; (4,1)}
3: {(1,6) ; (3,5)}
4: {(1,5) ; (3,4)}
5: {(3,4) ; (6,1)}
6: {(4,3) ; (5,2)}
7: {(4,2) ; (5,1)}
8: {(2,6) ; (3,6)}
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Fig. 4. Block diagram of the proposed watermarking algorithm.
5Algorithm 1: Embedding algorithm.
Input: s1, L,W,X
(s1: watermarking key, L: locations array, W :
watermarking text, X: host image)
Output: Y
(Y : watermarked image)
1: for i = 1→ size(W ) do
2: X8×8(i) = X;
{subdivide the host image (X) into blocks of 8× 8
pixel}
3: XDCT (i) = 2D-DCT (X8×8(i))
{Compute the 2D-DCT of each 8× 8 block of the
host image}
4: for each DCT block, generate 4 random numbers r
within the range of 1− 8 based on the private key s1.
5: if W(i) = 0 then
6: for j = 1→ 4 do
7: p = r(j) {select one of the random locations}
8: exchange DCT coefficients to meet this
condition DCT (Lp,1) < DCT (Lp,2)
{Now adjust the four values such that their
difference becomes larger than the strenghth
constant s, thus:}
9: if DCT (Lp,1)−DCT (Lp,2) < s then
10: DCT (Lp,1) = DCT (Lp,1) + s/2
11: DCT (Lp,2) = DCT (Lp,2)− s/2
12: end if
13: end for
14: else if W(i) = 1 then
15: for j = 1→ 4 do
16: p = r(j) {select one of the random locations}
17: exchange DCT coefficients to meet this
condition DCT (Lp,1) >= DCT (Lp,2)
{Now adjust the three values such that their
difference becomes larger than the strength
constant s, thus:}
18: if DCT (Lp,2)−DCT (Lp,1) < s then
19: DCT (Lp,2) = DCT (Lp,2) + s/2
20: DCT (Lp,1) = DCT (Lp,1)− s/2
21: end if
22: end for
23: end if
24: Take inverse DCT to reconstruct Y
25: end for
this means that the 2nd, 3rd, 5th and 8th rows from the location
array L will be chosen and the corresponding pairs will be
used for the embedding purpose. So, when the 8th row from
the location array (L) is selected, this means that p = 8 and
DCT (Lp,1) is (2,6) and DCT (Lp,2) is (3,6) which correspond
to the values of 58 and 57 in Fig. 3, respectively.
Moreover, to improve the robustness of the watermarking
algorithm, we propose to add a watermark strength constant
s such that DCTu1,v1−DCTu2,v2 > s. If coefficients do not
meet this criterion, a constant value will be added to satisfy
the relation.
Algorithm 2: Detection algorithm.
Input: s1, L, Y
(s1: watermarking key, L: locations array, Y :
watermarked image)
Output: W
(W : binary text)
1: for i = 1→ size(W ) do
2: for each DCT block, generate the same 4 random
numbers r within the range of 1− 8 based on the
private key s1.
3: Y8×8(i) = Y ;
{subdivide the cover image (Y ) into blocks of 8× 8
pixels}
4: YDCT (i) = 2D-DCT (Y8×8(i))
{Compute the 2D-DCT of each 8× 8 block of the
cover image}
5: for j = 1→ 4 do
6: p = r(j) {select one of the random locations}
7: if DCTp,1 > DCTp,2 then
8: W (i) = 1
9: else
10: W (i) = 0
11: end if
12: end for
13: reconstruct the binary text image W from W(i)
14: end for
1) Embedding algorithm: Each 8 × 8 block of image will
be used to hide one bit of watermark text. A binary text
image (W ) is taken as a watermarking object which can be
interpreted as a 1-D array of 1s and 0s. The watermark text
image carries the person’s bio-information such as name, ID
and date of birth. The steps of the embedding algorithm are
shown in Algorithm 1 while the flow chart is depicted in Fig.
4.
2) The strength of watermark: The robustness of the water-
mark has been increased by choosing an appropriate value of
the strength constant s. Increasing s will degrade the image
but it will reduce the chance of errors during the detection
phase. Experimental results indicate that setting s equal to 15
is the most suitable value in terms of perceptibility versus
robustness. Therefore, the experiments have been conducted
by keeping s = 15 for all the images.
TABLE I
THE LOCATIONS ARRAY (L) USED FOR SELECTING THE WATERMARKING
EMBEDDING LOCATIONS.
p 1 2
1 (1,4) (3,3)
2 (2,3) (4,1)
3 (1,6) (3,5)
4 (1,5) (3,4)
5 (3,4) (6,1)
6 (4,3) (5,2)
7 (4,2) (5,1)
8 (2,6) (3,6)
63) Detection algorithm: Watermark extraction is the reverse
procedure of the watermark embedding algorithm. The embed-
ding location will be selected based on the private key (s1)
which is either obtained from the smart card or generated from
the stored template in the database (share1) with the help of
a hash function as demonstrated later in Section IV-B1. The
steps of the detection algorithm are shown in Algorithm 2.
B. Stage Two: Visual Cryptography
Attacks on the stored biometric template in a database are
considered as one of the most destructive attacks because
they lead to different vulnerabilities [32] such as gaining an
unauthorized access to the system by creating a physical spoof
from the template [6], [7], [33]. In addition, they allow an
unauthorized access to the system by the replication of the
stolen template to the matcher. Moreover, the stored template
could be replaced by an imposter. In this section, we propose a
novel template protection scheme in order to tackle the above
problems. Furthermore, to protect the integrity of the template
saved on the card or database, the SHA-2 hash function is
used. SHA-2 is a set of one way hash functions designed by
NSA [34] which generates a unique signature of a vector.
Therefore, the hash function is implemented to generate a
unique signature of the template as will be discussed in the
next sub-section. The proposed template protection method
consists of two modules namely: (A) Enrolment module and
(B) Authentication module.
1) Enrolment module: In this module, feature encoding is
implemented by convolving the normalized iris template with
a 1-D log-Gabor filter. The output of filtering is then phase
quantized to four levels using the Daugman method [5], with
each filter producing two bits of data for each phase to form
the binary template (IrisCode).
Then, the binary template is decomposed into two shares
using (2,2) VC and the original template is discarded. After
that, two 256 bit signatures s1 and s2 are generated as
signatures for share1 and share2 respectively using the SHA-
256 hash function to maintain the integrity of the iris template.
In the enrolment stage, one of the decomposed shares (share1)
is stored in the database along with s2 (signature of share2)
while share2 and s1 are given to the user on a smart card. s1
is also used as the private key which selects the watermarking
embedding locations. The enrolment stage is shown in Fig. 5.
2) Authentication module: During the authentication pro-
cess, the system sends a request to the database to fetch the
corresponding share based on the generated signature (s2)
from share2. Then, the obtained share from the database is
stacked together with the user’s share from the smart card in
order to reconstruct the original iris template. Moreover, to
make sure that the template in the smart card or the database
is not altered, the SHA-256 hash function is generated again
and compared with the stored signatures s1 and s2. If the sig-
natures do not match, authorization will not be granted. After
that, the inbound user’s iris template and the reconstructed iris
template from the smart card and the database are compared
together to authenticate the user. The authentication module is
illustrated in Fig. 6.
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Fig. 7. Down sampling to retrieve the original template size.
In order to restore the original template size after the
expansion by VC, the reconstructed template is down sampled
by selecting only one pixel from every 2× 2 block as shown
in Fig. 7. Thus, the generated image will have the same size
of the original template and less storage and computational
requirements.
V. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND RESULTS
The proposed method has been tested on the CASIA V4 and
the UBIRIS V1 databases. The CASIA V4 was released by the
Institute of Automation, Chinese Academy of Sciences [35]. It
contains 16212 images from 819 classes. It was collected in an
indoor environment under the near-infrared light. On the other
hand, the UBIRIS V1 iris image database was released by the
University of Beira, Portugal [36]. It contains 1877 images
from 241 subjects in two different sessions. All images are
taken under visible light.
For the first stage, the iris images were watermarked with
the 64×64 pixel text image shown in Fig. 8 (d) after converting
it to a binary image. On the other hand, after feature extraction,
the generated template is decomposed with (2,2) VC into two
shares: one share is saved in the database and the other is
saved on a smart card with template on card architecture as
proposed in the previous work [37]. In the next sub-sections,
an analysis is presented for each stage of the proposed scheme.
A. Stage one: watermarking
A good watermarking algorithm should meet different re-
quirements such as perceptibility, robustness to various image
manipulations and it should not degrade the matching per-
formance of the biometric system significantly. In order to
Fig. 8. Perceptibility of the watermarked image; (a) original image, (b)
watermarked image, (c) the difference image, (d) original watermark, (e)
binarized text and (f) the extracted watermark.
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evaluate the proposed watermarking method, a set of different
tests has been carried out as shown in the next sub-sections.
1) Watermark Perceptibility: The similarity between the
original and the watermarked image (perceptibility) indicates
the impact of the watermarking algorithm on the cover image.
Therefore, in a good watermarking algorithm, the watermark-
ing effect should be imperceptible to the user. Fig. 8 (c)
demonstrates that the difference between the original and the
watermarked iris image is not noticeable to the naked eye
without the help of the image processing techniques.
To quantitatively evaluate the performance of the water-
marking algorithm, Peak Signal to Noise Ratio (PSNR) and Bit
Error Rate (BER) are calculated. The average PSNR between
the original iris and the watermarked iris is 38.47 and the
average BER is 0.22% while the average PSNR and BER
of the extracted watermarking text are 84.63 and 0.023%,
respectively.
2) Effect on Matching Performance: To investigate the
effect of the proposed watermarking algorithm on the iris
recognition performance, Daugman’s approach [5] for iris
recognition has been implemented with the segmentation algo-
rithm proposed in our previous work [38], then the Equal Error
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Fig. 9. Effect of the proposed watermarking algorithm on the iris recognition performance: (a) UBIRIS V1 and (b) CASIA V4.
Rate (EER) is calculated for the non-watermarked iris images.
After that, the proposed watermarking algorithm is applied on
the same iris images and the EER is calculated again. Fig. 9
illustrates the effect of the proposed watermarking algorithm
on iris recognition performance in terms of the Receiver
Operating Characteristics (ROC) curve and EER. According
to Fig. 9, the proposed watermarking algorithm barely disturb
the EER across both UBIRIS V1 and CASIA V4 databases.
Consequently, the proposed watermarking algorithm does not
involve a noticeable effect on the iris recognition performance.
3) Performance against compression and noise: Other fac-
tors that may degrade the images were tested here such as
compression and noising. In fact, the compression of large
images become inevitable when transmitting such images over
low bandwidth channels. On the other hand, there is an
increased susceptibility to image degradation due to the noise
in such channels.
To simulate these factors, the image compression algorithm,
Joint Photograph Expert Group (JPEG) has been applied with
different quality factors (Q) on the watermarked iris images.
In addition, we applied additive zero mean white Gaussian
noise (AWGN) to the watermarked iris images with zero mean
and variance equal to 10−3. Table II clearly indicates that the
extracted text is still discernible even after adding a Gaussian
noise or applying JPEG compression with different quality
factors.
4) Performance against image manipulations and attacks:
The proposed watermarking algorithm was tested against var-
ious number of image manipulations such as median filtering,
histogram equalization, compression, cropping and noising.
In addition, the BER and PSNR of the extracted text were
calculated for each type of manipulation as shown in Table II.
In addition, the recognition performances of the water-
marked iris images are compared with the manipulated iris
images in terms of ROC curves and EER as shown in Fig.
10. The slight degradation in the recognition performance in
these cases is due to the added noise factors and not due to
the watermarking algorithm.
5) Comparison with other watermarking methods: In order
to appreciate the efficiency of the proposed method, different
image watermarking methods such as LSB [39], Code Division
Multiple Access (CDMA) [40] and DWT with Pseudo Noise
(DWT-PN) [41], [42] are implemented and compared with our
method and the same manipulations are applied to the wa-
termarked iris images. Moreover, the proposed watermarking
scheme is implemented with different strength constants as
shown in Fig. 11 which depicts the extracted watermark after
various manipulations using different watermarking methods.
As expected the LSB technique could not tolerate most of
the attacks and the watermarked image is destroyed; whereas,
CDMA and DWT-PN perform slightly better than LSB by
tolerating JPEG compression, however, they failed to overtake
several types of manipulations. On the other hand, exchanging
only one pair of DCT coefficients failed to withstand all
attacks because the coefficient can be easily destroyed by
noise. It is noticed that there is a prominent improvement in the
performance of the watermarking algorithm after adding the
proposed strength constant but it is still vulnerable to median
filtering and compression. On the contrary, the proposed al-
gorithm which randomly exchanges four pairs with a strength
constant (s = 15) sustained all the above image manipulations
and demonstrated that the watermarking scheme is resistant to
different types of attacks.
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TABLE II
BER AND PSNR OF THE EXTRACTED WATERMARK AFTER DIFFERENT MANIPULATIONS USING DIFFERENT WATERMARKING ALGORITHMS.
Manipulation type DWT-PN LSB CDMA ProposedPSNR BER PSNR BER PSNR BER PSNR BER
JPEG (Q=70) 70.14 0.54% D D 65.1 2.3% 84.25 0.024%
JPEG (Q=60) 60.23 4.15% D D 63.89 3.7% 83.25 0.044%
Median 3× 3 21.25 39.56% D D 55.88 6.6% 69.88 1.2%
Histogram equalization D* D D D D D 76.47 0.15%
Gaussian white noise,(v = 10−3) D D 19 40.2% 26.4 28.5% 79.21 0.076%
Salt & pepper,(noise density=0.005) 30.15 10.18% 61.36 2.29% 32.15 9.18% 70.63 0.56%
Cropping (33%) 45.21 7.84% 47.15 5.05% 41.21 6.84% 79.48 0.074%
*D: means that the watermarking text is destroyed.
B. Stage two: visual cryptography
The proposed scheme achieves the template protection re-
quirements namely: revocability, diversity, security and perfor-
mance maintenance [32], [43]. Firstly, in terms of revocability,
whenever the iris template stored in the smart card/database
is compromised, a new iris template can be generated and
decomposed into new shares. Nevertheless, to boost the se-
curity, this operation is recommended to be carried out at
regular intervals. Secondly, as for diversity, the shares appear
as random noise, therefore, it is hard to match them across
the database as demonstrated later in Section V-B3. Thirdly,
the iris template is secured after the VC because the iris
template can only be generated if both shares are available
simultaneously. Therefore, even if the smart card is lost or
stolen, the attacker will not be able to generate the iris
template. Fourthly, the performance of the biometric system
is not affected by the proposed scheme as using the original
template or the generated template from VC gave the same
EER in both cases.
In the next sub-sections, we carry out different statistical
tests in order to check for randomness in the encrypted
template and check its ability to confront the statistical attacks.
1) Adjacent pixels correlation: To test the randomness of
the generated shares after VC, the correlation coefficient [44]
of the adjacent pixels is tested. In a random image, the adjacent
pixels should have little correlation amongst them.
Table III lists the averages of the horizontal, vertical and
diagonal correlation coefficients of the adjacent pixels for the
template, share1 and share2 respectively. It can be seen from
Table III that there is a very little correlation among the pixels
of the shares while the original template pixels have a high
correlation.
2) Pixel distribution test: This test is used to check the
distribution of the pixels in the resulting share. A random
vector should have almost a uniform distribution of zeros and
ones. To check the distribution, the number of pixels in each
row of the original templates is counted and plotted, then it
compared with the encrypted shares before down-sampling.
Fig. 12 shows that the pixels of the encrypted share are
uniformly distributed across all the columns which confirms
the random nature of the resultant shares.
3) Share to template matching: In this test, the possibility
of share matching against a template is investigated. The
procedure consists of matching a probe against the whole
gallery in the database. The shares are used after down
sampling as probes and the original templates are used as a
gallery. The result in terms of EER is equal to 47% which
clearly indicates that it is not possible to authorize a person
with either of the shares. On the other hand, using the original
template or the generated template from VC gave the same
EER in both cases. These results clearly indicate that the
iris recognition performance is not affected when using the
TABLE III
ADJACENT PIXEL CORRELATION COEFFICIENT.
Horizontal Vertical Diagonal
Template -0.0724 0.5397 0.0452
Share1 -0.5014 0.0037 -0.0078
Share2 -0.4942 -0.0035 0.0078
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Fig. 12. Pixels distribution: (a) the original iris template and (b) the encrypted
share.
proposed VC scheme.
4) Unlinkability of protected shares: Unlinkability means
that protected templates should not allow cross-matching so
that protected templates generated from a single object should
differ from each other (diversity) [18]. The unlinkability of
the shares is tested by matching a probe against the whole
gallery in the database. The shares are used as a gallery and
each share is used as a probe to perform cross-matching. This
resulted in EER equals to 48.5% which clearly indicates the
unlinkability of the shares.
C. Computation Time
All experiments were conducted on a 3.2 GHz core i5
PC with 8 GB of RAM under the Matlab environment. The
proposed method can be divided into two stages namely:
watermarking and VC.
The proposed watermarking algorithm is based on the DCT
which is widely used in real time devices. This is because
the DCT can be implemented easily as it is based on real
cosine basis functions that are easy to compute and imple-
ment [49]. Although the direct application of these formulas
would require O(N2) operations, the same formula can be
implemented with only O(NlogN) complexity by factorizing
the computation with a similar approach to the fast Fourier
transform [50]. On the other hand, the VC scheme proposed
TABLE VI
THE AVERAGE COMPUTATION TIMES (IN SEC) OF EACH STAGE
IN THE PROPOSED ALGORITHM.
CASIA V4 UBIRIS V1
Watermarking 0.42 0.53
VC 0.1 0.1
Total 0.52 0.63
in this paper utilizes the logical XOR operator which is
mapped to a single-cycle operation on modern processors.
Therefore, the overall complexity of the proposed approach
can be approximated to [O(NlogN) + O(N)] which can be
approximated to O(NlogN) for large values of N .
Table VI shows the average computation time for each stage
of the proposed method in each database. The variations in the
computation times among databases in the watermarking stage
are due to the different images size. The proposed method
takes less than a second to be executed which implies that it
is suitable for real time and practical in many applications.
Although the reported computational time of the proposed
scheme is short, this time can be drastically reduced with code
optimization and porting to a compiled language since there
are no involved computations.
D. Comparisons with state-of-the-art methods
In order to achieve a fair comparison, each protection layer
in the proposed protection scheme is considered individually.
In terms of watermarking, comparison with the same scenario
is difficult because most of the papers in the literature focus on
protecting the biometric data with watermarking by embedding
such data in a cover signal [10], [11], [45]. However, a few
focus on protecting the biometric image itself [12]. Table IV
lists the few available state-of-the-art biometric watermarking
methods. The work of [10] adopted the DWT and SVD
to embed the iris feature inside an arbitrary cover image.
However, the watermarked image and a key are required
during the watermarking extraction stage [10]. Similarly, the
work of [45] exploited the DWT and SVD to embed the
fingerprint feature inside a face image. However, this method
requires a shuffling key to encrypt the watermarked image and
the performance of this method is affected by noise [45]. In
addition, the aforementioned methods used the SVD which
has a complexity of O(N2) in its best implementation [51].
In the work of [11], a watermarking algorithm is proposed to
embed the fingerprint and iris feature in the low frequency
coefficients of the DCT blocks of a cover image. The cover
image is then divided into smooth and edge blocks where the
latter are eliminated. Unfortunately, embedding the watermark
in the low frequency AC coefficients is vulnerable to attacks
[27]. In addition, removing the edge blocks will degrade the
watermarked image. In our previous work, we proposed to
protect the iris images based on interchanging fixed locations
of the DCT middle band coefficients [12]. However, there is a
possibility that an attacker can predict these fixed locations and
destroy the watermark information or embed false watermark
data.
In terms of template protection, as mentioned before, few
papers address biometric template protection with VC. Since
the same scenario is not available, we compare our proposed
VC method with the similar template protection scenarios
proposed in [15], [17], [46] as shown in Table V. A method
is proposed in [15] for preserving the privacy of the iris
template. This method involves some performance degradation
as well as complex operations to generate the BioCapsul and
requires keys to be extracted from the user’s signal. Next, an
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TABLE IV
COMPARISONS WITH STATE-OF-THE-ART BIOMETRIC WATERMARKING METHODS.
Watermarking
method
Type Approach Remarks Complexity
Majumder et al. [10] Embed iris feature insidean arbitrary cover image. DWT and SVD.
-Requires the watermarked image and a key
during the watermark extraction stage. O(N
2)
Paunwala et al. [11] Embed fingerprint and iris featureinside an arbitrary cover image.
Embeds watermark in low frequency
AC coefficients of selected DCT blocks.
-Embedding the watermark in low frequency
AC coefficients makes it vulnerable to attacks.
-Removing the edge blocks degrades the
watermarked image.
O(NlogN)
Nafea et al. [45] Embed fingerprint featuresinside a face image. DWT and SVD.
-The performance of proposed approach is
degraded with the presence of noise. O(N
2)
Abdullah et al. [12] embed text data as a contextual
watermark in the biometric image.
Exchanging fixed locations of the
DCT middle band coefficients.
-The embedded data could be corrupted
if the fixed locations are divulged. O(NlogN)
Proposed Randomly exchanging four middleband coefficients of the DCT blocks. -Applicable to multiple biometrics. O(NlogN)
TABLE V
COMPARISONS WITH STATE-OF-THE-ART IRIS TEMPLATE PROTECTION METHODS.
Template protection method Remarks Complexity
BioCapsule [15] -Involves some performance degradation.-Limited to the biometrics traits that adopt Gabor filter for feature extraction. [15]. O(N
2)
Bloom filters [17] -Vulnerable to reversibility and cross shares matching [18]. O(N)
Cancelable biometrics [46] -Vulnerable to reversibility, spoofing and coalition attacks [47], [48]. O(N)
Proposed (VC) -No performance degradation. O(N)
alternative method is proposed in [17] to protect the binary
iris template based on bloom filters. However, Hermans et
al. [18] demonstrate that the work of [17] is vulnerable to
cross-shares matching and the reversibility is possible for a
nonuniform randomly generated template. On the other hand,
the cancelable biometric approach is proposed for iris template
protection in [46]. Yet, the work of [47] demonstrated that
there are several drawbacks of using the cancelable biometrics
such as reversibility and venerability to spoofing and coalition
attacks.
In this paper, all the previous drawbacks have been ad-
dressed since the proposed watermarking approach is ro-
bust against noise and considered as a “blind watermarking
technique” as it does not require the original image for
extracting the embedded watermark. In addition, the proposed
watermarking method makes no restrictive hypothesis on the
biometric image and hence it is applicable to multiple bio-
metrics traits. On the other hand, our proposed VC scheme
does not involve any effect on the iris recognition performance
and does not require any key for the decryption. Moreover,
integrating the hash function with the smart card will maintain
the integrity of the stored data and offers robustness against
data modification attempts in either the smart card or the
database.
E. Applicability and Limitations
The proposed scheme is designed to effectively protect the
image and template of the iris biometric. One of the main
advantages of our proposed watermarking scheme is that it
can be readily applied to any type of images other than the
iris images. Yet, the type of the embedded data should be
binary data such as a binary image or an ASCII code. Since
one bit can be hidden in each image block, the maximum size
of the embedded data is equal to (height×width)/blocksize.
For example, for a block size of 8, if an image resolution is
800× 600, the maximum watermark size will be 7500 bits.
On the other hand, the proposed VC scheme is capable of
working with binary template or data. This type of biometric
template is widely used in feature representation of various
biometric traits such as iris, face and fingerprint [5], [52], [53].
The stored template in the database has almost the same
size of the conventional IrisCode with only 256 additional
bits for the hash function. In addition, the watermarked iris
image has a similar size to the original iris image. This makes
it analogous to available iris recognition systems in terms of
database handling.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
The work proposed in this paper aimed to bring insight
into the problem of biometric security. Novel schemes were
proposed for iris image and template protection which consist
of two security layers. The first layer is a robust watermarking
algorithm which was implemented to protect the integrity of
the biometric image. In particular, a binary text image that
accommodates the bio data of the person to be authenticated
was embedded in the iris image by randomly interchanging
four pairs of the DCT middle band coefficients. The embed-
ding locations were randomly selected based on a private key.
Moreover, the proposed strength constant s was included to
add more robustness to the watermarking algorithm.
The second layer involved using the VC to protect the iris
template by decomposing the original iris template into two
shares using (2,2) VC where one share is given to the user
on a smart card while the other is stored in a database. The
proposed VC scheme allows the iris template to be perfectly
restored with the same quality and size when the shares are
available, and therefore it does not hinder the iris recognition
performance. To this end, an extra layer of security is provided
to the iris template because even if either of the shares in
the database or the smart card is compromised, the original
template cannot be retrieved. Further, the integrity of the iris
templates, in both the smart card and the database, is also
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guaranteed with the use of the hash signatures. The generated
signature from the hash function is not only beneficial to
maintain the integrity of the smart card but also it has been
used to select the embedding locations for the watermarking
algorithm.
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